A recent caseDarren Chaker explains that in the context of Penal Code section 186.22, subd. (a), the predicate offense required to show a pattern of criminal gang activity can be established by evidence of an offense that defendant committed on a separate occasion and the prosecution is not required to exclude such evidence even when it can otherwise be established that the requisite predicate offenses were committed by other gang members. Appellant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted premeditated murder, and active participation in a criminal street gang. As to the gang offense, the prosecution introduced evidence of appellant’s involvement with the VFL gang, that the gang engaged in extortion as one of its primary activities, and certified copies of appellant’s conviction for extortion.
Darren Chaker also notes that Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (a), the STEP Act, defines a criminal street gang as “any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more criminal acts enumerated [in the statute], [and] having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.” In People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, the Supreme Court held that the predicate offense establishing a pattern of criminal gang activity could be established by evidence of the charged offense.
Here, the court expanded on the ruling and found that the predicate offense can also be established by proof of an offense the defendant committed on a separate occasion. Introduction of such evidence is subject only to the qualifications of Evidence Code section 352, holding that such evidence should be excluded only when its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial value. In this case, the admission of appellant’s 1993-1994 conviction for extortion was proper because it was probative to the charge of active participation in a criminal street gang, provided direct evidence of a predicate offense, as well as evidence that appellant participated in the VFL gang and knew VFL engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity. The evidence was not unduly prejudicial and the court provided an appropriate limiting instruction on the use of the evidence.
By Darren Chaker – In a California rape trial, where defense of consent is made, Darren Chaker goes over the court ruling. In a jury trial for attempted rape, when there is substantial evidence of victim’s equivocal conduct that would have led defendant to reasonably and in good faith to believe consent existed when it did not, it is error not to instruct on mistake belief of consent.
Where the defense of consent as a defense to rape in California, Appellant and the victim met each other at a bar. The two struck up a conversation and appellant bought her a beer. Over the evening, they remained with each other, becoming somewhat amorous and continuing to drink. Appellant then accompanied her home. At this point, appellant’s and the victim’s accounts of the following events differed, with appellant testifying that the two engaged in mutual foreplay while the victim testified that when she came out of the bathroom, appellant forced himself on her although she objected.
Darren Chaker notes that evidence was also presented that at the time of the claimed assault, the victim’s blood alcohol level, based on the amount of alcohol she reportedly consumed, would have been approximately .20%. The court failed to instruct on good faith but mistaken belief in consent. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on some of the charged sex offenses, acquitted appellant of attempted sexual penetration by force, but convicted him of attempted rape by force.
The appellate court rejected the Attorney General’s contention that because victim and appellant gave contradictory versions of the incident, and because appellant stopped his advances when she rejected him, appellant was not entitled to a mistaken consent instruction. “A requested instruction regarding mistake of fact [is] required when some evidence deserving of . . . consideration exist[s] to support that contention.” (People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 157.) The court continued to state:
“The court refused to give requested instructions that directed the jury to acquit Franklin of the rape and kidnaping if the jury had a reasonable doubt as to whether Franklin reasonably and genuinely believed that Miss B. freely consented to her movement from the grocery store to his apartment and to sexual intercourse with him. Franklin contends that the court thereby erred. The Attorney General argues that the court properly refused to give the instructions because “mistake of fact instruction[s] as to consent should be rejected as against the law and public policy.””
Here, the evidence was such that the jury should have been instructed on appellant’s good faith but mistaken belief in consent. The error was prejudicial because if the jury found that appellant had a reasonable belief that the victim consented, he lacked the specific intent for rape.
California habeas corpus petition was filed, Darren Chaker blogs about where the Ninth Circuit decided a Defendant is not entitled to federal habeas relief where state court finding that he did not unequivocally invoke his right to an attorney, was not an unreasonable application of federal law. In 1999 Sessoms and two others committed a homicide during a Sacramento robbery. He fled to Oklahoma City, where he was arrested. Sacramento police traveled to Oklahoma City to interrogate him. Before receiving Miranda warnings, Sessoms asked whether there was any possible way he could have a lawyer present. He said his father told him to get a lawyer. The police affirmed he had a right to counsel and read him his rights. Sessoms thereafter confessed. The state appellate courts affirmed the trial court’s denial of Sessoms’ motion to suppress his statement, finding neither of Sessoms’ statements were sufficiently clear such that a reasonable officer would understand he was requesting counsel. He was convicted of murder.
AEDPA limits the federal court’s review of state court opinions. Under 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d), a writ of habeas corpus will only be granted where the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,” Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or where it is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Ninth Circuit noted that neither party challenged the state court’s use of the legal standard set forth in Davis v. U.S. (1994) 512 U.S. 452, to determine whether Sessoms invoked his right to counsel. The court found that Davis was limited to postwaiver statements and is therefore not “clearly established Federal law” in Sessoms’ case. Without Davis, the court was unable to locate any Supreme Court precedent for determining whether Sessoms invoked his right to counsel in a prewaiver contest. It therefore evaluated the claim under the Edwards v.Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, standard — that an accused must have “actually invoked his right to counsel.”
Although Sessoms’ statements raise a close question under Edwards, the state court finding did not constitute an error “well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-mind disagreement” as required by AEDPA. Further, officers were not required to ask clarifying questions before proceeding with their interrogation. There is no Supreme Court authority requiring such action and Sessoms’ reliance on federal law to that effect is unavailing. State courts are not bound under AEDPA by federal cases other than precedent established by the Supreme Court.
Darren Chaker has been very successful in advising high net worth clients how to protect assets, especially when it comes within the realm of intellectual property.
Federal law protects login information. In Chauvin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, No. 10-11735, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121600 (S.D. Mich. Oct. 20, 2011), the court affirmed an award of sanctions against the defendant due to its motion to compel production of the plaintiff’s Facebook password. The court upheld the decision of the magistrate judge, who had concluded that the content the defendant sought to discover was available “through less intrusive, less annoying and less speculative means,” even if relevant. Furthermore, there was no indication that granting access to the account would be reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible information. Thus, the motion to compel warranted an award of sanctions.
A smart tactic to use would be to store the password information would be contained
in a stored database within the website – thus would qualify as electronically stored content.
If counsel were to somehow convince the court to review the blog, and in an effort to guard against overly broad disclosure of a party’s social media information, some courts have conducted an in-camera review prior to production. For example, in Offenback v. Bowman, a No. 1:10-cv-1789, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66432 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2011), the magistrate judge conducted an in-camera review of the plaintiff’s Facebook account and ordered the production of a “small segment” of the account as relevant to the plaintiff’s physical condition. In most cases, there is no financial worth of the blogs: no money is made on them, credit card, or other financial information is not processed, and ad space is not sold. Thus, have no materiality to counsel.
Darren Chaker also notes in Douglas v. Riverwalk Grill, LLC, No. 11-15230, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120538 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2012), the court ordered the plaintiff to provide the contents for in camera review. After conducting its review of “literally thousands of entries,” the court noted that “majority of the issues bear absolutely no relevance” to the case. In particular, the court found that the only entries that could be considered discoverable were those written by the plaintiff, which could be in the form of “comments” he made on another’s post or updates to his own “status.” The court identified the specific entries it had determined were discoverable. However, using an in camera method is not required. In Tomkins v. Detroit Metropolitan Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387 (E.D. Mich. 2012), the court declined the parties’ suggestion that it conduct an in camera review, explaining that “such review is ordinarily utilized only when necessary to resolve disputes concerning privilege; it is rarely used to determine relevance.”
In Tomkins v. Detroit Metropolitan Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387 (E.D. Mich. 2012), the court declined the parties’ suggestion that it conduct an in camera review, explaining that “such review is ordinarily utilized only when necessary to resolve disputes concerning privilege; it is rarely used to determine relevance.”
Providers, including Facebook, take the position that the SCA prohibits them from disclosing social media contents, even by subpoena. From Facebook’s website:
A blog is similar to Facebook where people interact, post thoughts, opinions on topics. One of the more well-known instances of people trying to force their way into a blog is seen in federal law prohibits Facebook from disclosing “user content (such as messages, Wall (timeline) posts, photos, etc.), in response to a civil subpoena. Specifically, the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., prohibits Facebook from disclosing the contents of an account to any non-governmental entity pursuant to a subpoena or court order.
One of the earliest cases to address the issue, Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal. 2010), concluded that the SCA prohibited a social-networking site from producing a user’s account contents in response to a civil discovery subpoena. In that case, the defendants served subpoenas on several third parties, including Facebook and MySpace, seeking communications between the plaintiff and another individual. The plaintiff moved to quash the subpoenas.
And Last, Darren Chaker explains, the court held that plaintiff had standing to bring the motion, explaining that “an individual has a personal right in information in his or her profile and inbox on a social-networking site and his or her webmail inbox in the same way that an individual has a personal right in employment and bank records.” Moreover, the court determined that the providers were electronic communication service (ECS) providers under the SCA and were thus prohibited from disclosing information contained in “electronic storage.” Last, Plaintiff does not have the luxury of seeking a subpoena for the records.
See, U.S. Internet Service Provider Association, Electronic Evidence Compliance—A Guide for Internet Service Providers, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 945, 965 (2003) ([No Stored Communications Act provision] “permits disclosure pursuant to a civil discovery order unless the order is obtained by a government entity. … [T]he federal prohibition against divulging email contents remains stark, and there is no obvious exception for a civil discovery order on behalf of a private party.”)
See, also, J.T. Shannon Lumber Co., Inc. v. Gilco Lumber Inc., 2008 WL 4755370 (N.D.Miss. 2008) (holding there is no “exception to the [SCA] for civil discovery or allow for coercion of defendants to allow such disclosure.”); Viacom Intern. Inc. v. Youtube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“ECPA § 2702 contains no exception for disclosure of [the content of] communications pursuant to civil discovery requests.”); Thayer v. Chiczewski, 2009 WL 2957317 (N.D.Ill. 2009) (“most courts have concluded that third parties cannot be compelled to disclose electronic communications pursuant to a civil–as opposed to criminal–discovery subpoena”); Mintz v. Mark Bartelstein & Associates, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“The SCA does not contain an exception for civil discovery subpoenas.”).
While reviewing recent law concerning deportation, Darren Chaker found the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that an alien whose offense would have qualified for treatment under the Federal First Offender Act (“FFOA”), but who was convicted and had his conviction expunged under state or foreign law, may not be removed on account of that offense. See Dillingham v. INS, 267 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2001); Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000). To qualify for treatment under the FFOA, the defendant must (1) have been found guilty of an offense described in section 404 of the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), 21 U.S.C. § 844; (2) have not, prior to the commission of such an offense, been convicted of violating a federal or state law relating to controlled substances; and (3) have not previously been accorded first offender treatment under any law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3607(a); Cardenas-Uriarte v. INS, 227 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000).
A. Expungement Under State or Foreign Law
The alien’s prior conviction must have already been expunged pursuant to the state or foreign expungement statute; the possibility that the alien may request and have his conviction expunged in the future is not sufficient to avoid the consequences of removal. See Chavez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1284, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 2004).
The state or foreign statute under which the conviction was expunged does not have to be an identical procedural counterpart to the FFOA. See Garberding v. INS, 30 F.3d 1187, 1190-1191 (9th Cir. 1994). See also Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 738 n.18 (“[R]elief does not depend on whether or not the state rehabilitative statute is best understood as allowing for ‘vacaturs,’ ‘set-asides,’ ‘deferred adjudications,’ or some other procedure.”). The Ninth Circuit has recognized expungements for FFOA purposes where the state court “has entered an order pursuant to a state rehabilitative statute under which the criminal proceedings have been deferred pending successful completion of probation or the proceedings have been or will be dismissed after probation.” Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 738 n. 18 (emphasis in original) (quoting Matter of Manrique, 21 I&N Dec. 58, 64 (BIA 1995)). The Ninth Circuit has not yet decided whether an alien who has received a court order deferring adjudication, but has not yet had his proceedings expunged because he has not completed his term of probation, is eligible for FFOA treatment. See id. at 746 n.28; Chavez-Perez, 386 F.3d at 1293.
B. Offenses Described in Section 404 of the Controlled Substances Act
Section 404 of the CSA provides that it is “unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance . . . .” 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Any state or foreign possession of a controlled substances offenses, such as those set forth in sections 11350(a) and 1137 of the California Health and Safety Code (“CHSC”), are described in section 404 of the CSA and are therefore potentially eligible for FFOA treatment.
1. Possession of Drug Paraphernalia
Darren Chaker found the Ninth Circuit has recognized that “the plain language of the statute suggests that possession of drug paraphernalia should not be included as an offense described in section 844,” since paraphernalia is not a controlled substance. Cardenas-Uriarte, 227F.3d at 1137. Nonetheless, in Cardenas-Uriarte, the Ninth Circuit determined that theapplication of the plain meaning of the statute in that instance would lead to both an absurd result and frustrate congressional intent. See id. The petitioner had initially been charged with two counts of possession, but had pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of possession of drug paraphernalia. Id. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that refusing to allow the petitioner’s offense to receive treatment under the FFOA would lead to an absurd result since the petitioner would have been eligible had he refused to plea guilty and been convicted, as initially charged, of the graver offense of possession. See id. The Ninth Circuit further determined that applying the plain meaning of the FFOA would frustrate congressional intent:
Congress intended to allow those convicted of the least serious type of drug offenses to qualify under the Act. Congress would never have considered including possession of drug paraphernalia under this statute because no federal statute covers the crime of possession of drug paraphernalia. Where possession of drug paraphernalia is a less serious offense than simple possession of a controlled substance, therefore, congressional intent indicates that it should be included under the Act. See id. The Ninth Circuit therefore held that the petitioner’s conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia qualified for treatment under the FFOA.
2. Use or Being Under the Influence
Nor is use or being under the influence an offense described in the plain language of section 404 of the CSA. See 21 U.S.C. 844. The Ninth Circuit has not yet determined whether use or FFOA. See Aguiluz-Arellano v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing its holding that the petitioner’s use or being under the influence was not eligible for FFOA treatment as a result of his prior controlled substance conviction from the Board’s determination that the FFOA only applies to possession of a controlled substance, not to use or being under the influence offenses).
Extending the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Cardenas-Uriarte, however, may be warranted if the application of the plain meaning of the statute frustrates congressional intent. In Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 734-35, the Ninth Circuit described the FFOA as “a limited federal rehabilitative statute that permits first-time drug offenders who commit the least serious type of drug offense to avoid the drastic consequences which typically follow a finding of guilt in drug cases.” Congressional intent may therefore be frustrated if the respondent is a first-time offender since “[d]rug use has generally been considered a less serious crime than possession.” Flores-Arellano v. INS, 5 F.3d 360, 363 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993). See also Medina v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2005). Further, as in Cardenas-Uriarte, federal law does not penalize use or being under the influence of a controlled substance. See 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.
Darren Chaker blog about Nevada law and impeachment of witnesses. In the great State of Nevada allows for impeachment in NRS 50.095, entitled, “Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime,” states, in pertinent part, “(1) For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime is admissible but only if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment for more than 1 year under the law under which the witness was convicted.” Taking it a step further, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that NRS 50.095 imposes no requirement that such impeachment should be limited to only those felonies directly relevant to truthfulness or veracity. Pineda v. State, 120 Nev. at 210, 88 P.3d at 832 (citing Yates v. State, 95 Nev. 446, 449-50, 596 P.2d 239, 241-42 (1979)). In other words, NRS 50.095 does not limit impeachment to only evidence of felonies relevant to truthfulness or veracity. Warren v. State, 124 P.3d 522, 529 (NV 2005) (citing Pineda v. State, 120 Nev. at 210, 88 P.3d at 832 (citing Yates v. State, 95 Nev. 446,449-50, 596 P.2d 239, 241-42 (1979))).
The Court has the discretion to simplify the issues and to exclude evidence, even if it is relevant, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that it will confuse the issues or mislead the jury. See NRS 48.035(1); Jeep Corporation v. Murray, 101 Nev. 640, 646, 708 P.2d 297, 301 (1985), says Darren Chaker.
In Plunkett v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court reiterated, “In line with California, we hold that our statutes do not preclude inquiry into the number and names of the prior felony convictions.” 84 Nev. 145, 437 P.2d 92, 93 (1968)(citing People v. Smith, 63 Cal.2d 779, 409 P.2d 222, 230, 48 Cal.Rptr. 382 (1966)). In Houston v. Schomig, the Ninth Circuit Federal Judge held, “the details and circumstances of the prior crimes are … not appropriate subjects of inquiry.” 533 F.3d 1076 (9th Circ., 2008)(citing Plunkett v. State, 84 Nev. 145, 437 P.2d 92, 93 (1968)(citing People v. Smith, 63 Cal.2d 779, 409 P.2d 222, 230, 48 Cal.Rptr. 382 (1966))).
Of course, Darren Chaker also notes, as with most states, Nevada agrees that arrests and convictions for misdemeanors may not ordinarily be admitted even for limited purpose of attacking witnesses’ credibility. Sheriff, Washoe County v. Hawkins, 104 Nev. 70, 752 P.2d 769 (1988). The exception is typically a crime of moral turpitude such as filing a false report, insurance claim, etc. Likewise, a witness’ credibility may be attacked by showing his conviction of felony but not by showing mere arrest. Johnson v. State, 82 Nev. 338, 418 P.2d 495 (1966).
Last, making False Statements to a Federal Agency does is not necessarily a CIMT (Crime Involving Moral Turpitude), (construing 18 U.S.C. Section 1001, see Neely v. U.S., 300 F.2d 67 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 864 (1962)); Hirsch v. INS, 308 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1962).
Darren Chaker was on probation for a white collar crime. The record shows his bankruptcy attorney fraudulently filed a bankruptcy petition without Darren Chaker’s knowledge. The report states in part, “In my opinion Chaker’s attorney did not exercise a reasonable standard of care in filing a Second Bankruptcy Case without Chaker’s consent and signature. Indeed, in my opinion such conduct is fraudulent.” See expert report, page 7. Despite the conduct of his bankruptcy attorney, Darren Chaker was found guilty of only a single charge at trial. That conviction is being challenged. After serving a few months in minimum security, Darren Chaker started probation.
The Ninth Circuit, Case. No. 15-50138/ No. 15-50193, found, see opinion “Chaker’s blog post, which claimed that former police investigator Leesa Fazal “was forced out of the Las Vegas Metro Police Department,” does not qualify as harassment.” The court continued to state in relevant part, “The government also failed to prove that Chaker’s blog post satisfied the elements of defamation, including falsity and actual malice. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 279–80 (1964).”
The blog about Leesa Fazal was protected speech also in the sense it publicized on a matter of public importance. Specifically, Leesa Fazal had appeared to have been detained by police after being found having brought her gun into a San Diego court room. This videotaped by Darren Chaker, where Leesa Fazal was taken to a back room after being told not to leave. See video. The issue was that Leesa Fazal was not a peace officer in the State of California and appeared to may have broken the law. Thus, under Obsidian Fin. Grp. v. Cox, — F.3d –, 2014 WL 185376 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2014) where Darren Chaker was entitled to journalistic protection due to publishing material about a matter of public concern.
First Amendment law professor Eugene Volkah provided assistance to the attorneys for Darren Chaker. Such speech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt”). Even though the Internet is the newest medium for anonymous, uncomfortable expression touching on political or religious matters, online speech is equally protected under the First Amendment as there is “no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied” to online speech. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
The Supreme Court has directly considered factual circumstances where a petitioner was arrested for disorderly conduct after “verbally and negatively” protesting a police officer’s treatment of him, and concluded that “[s]urely, one is not to be punished for nonprovocatively voicing his objection to what he obviously felt was a highly questionable detention by a police officer.” Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14, 16 (1973); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 111 (1972) (“Individuals may not be convicted under the [disorderly conduct] statute merely for expressing unpopular or annoying ideas.”)
The First Amendment gives protection to those who want to speak on unpopular ideas. This protection also precludes the government from silencing the expression of unpopular ideas. See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[T]he First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”). See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.”).
First Amendment balancing test, Darren Chaker, in the Ninth Circuit and other courts view the balancing interests to determine to allow anonymous speech online, even where viewpoint discrimination may be at play. In order to balance these interests, the courts have drawn by analogy from the balancing test that many courts have adopted in deciding whether to compel the disclosure of anonymous sources or donors. United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Cervantes v. Time, 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972); Baker v. F&F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir.1972). See also UAW v. National Right to Work, 590 F.2d 1139, 1152 (D.C. Cir.1978); Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Moreover, the anonymous publication of musical works, like other forms of performance, is speech protected by the First Amendment. In re Verizon Internet Svces, 257 F. Supp.2d 244, 260 (D.D.C. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir.).
Accordingly, the courts that have considered this question have adopted a several-part balancing test to decide whether to compel the identification of an anonymous Internet speaker so that he may be served with process.
This test was most fully articulated in Dendrite v. Doe, 775 A2d 756 (N.J.App. 2001), which remains the only appellate opinion in the country to face the question squarely. Dendrite requires the would-be plaintiff to (1) use the Internet to notify the accused of the pendency of the identification proceeding and to explain how to present a defense; (2) quote verbatim the statements allegedly actionable; (3) allege all elements of the cause of action; (4) present evidence supporting the claim of violation, and (5) show the court that, on balance and in the particulars of the case.
Darren Chaker looked at several other courts have similarly set forth requirements of notice, review of the complaint, and presentation of argument and evidence before an ISP will be compelled to identify an Internet speaker. For example, in Melvin v. Doe, 49 Pa.D.&C.4th 449 (2000), appeal quashed, 789 A.2d 696, 2001 Pa.Super. 330 (2001), appeal reinstated, 836 A.2d 42 (Pa. 2003), the trial court allowed an anonymous defendant to present evidence and seek summary judgment, ordering disclosure only after finding genuine issues of material fact requiring trial. In reversing the denial of the defendant’s interlocutory appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court discussed at length the conflict between the right to speak anonymously and the plaintiff’s right to identify a potential defendant, and remanded for consideration of whether evidence of actual damage had to be presented before the right of anonymous speech could be disregarded. 836 A.2d at 47-50.
Similarly, in La Societe Metro Cash & Carry France v. Time Warner Cable, 2003 WL 22962857 (Conn. Super.), the court applied a balancing test and considered evidence that allegedly defamatory statements were false and caused injury before deciding to allow discovery concerning the identity of the speaker. In Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 FRD 573 (N.D.Cal. 1999), the court required the plaintiff to make a good faith effort to communicate with the anonymous defendants and provide them with notice that the suit had been filed against them, thus assuring them an opportunity to defend their anonymity, and also compelled the plaintiff to demonstrate that it had viable claims against such defendants. Id. at 579.
Last, Darren Chaker found, in Re Subpoena to America Online, 52 Va.Cir. 26, 34 (2000), rev’d on other grounds, 542 S.E.2d. 377 (Va. 2001), the court required introduction of the allegedly actionable Internet posting, and required that the court be “satisfied by the pleadings or evidence supplied” that the subpoenaing party had a legitimate basis to contend that it was the victim of actionable conduct, “and . . . the subpoenaed identity information [must be] centrally needed to advance that claim.
Darren Chaker reviews search and seizure law in California and how a search warrant is obtained. Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the Unites States Constitution, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause. However, the showing required to establish probable cause is not beyond a reasonable doubt. “The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, … there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527.)
An affidavit in support of a search warrant must describe with reasonable particularity the place to be searched and the places to be seized. (People v. Alvarado (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 285, 291; People v. Barthel (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 827, 832.) The test for the latter is “whether the warrant places a meaningful restriction on the objects to be seized.” (People v. Alvarado, supra, 255 Cal.App.2d at p. 291;People v. Barthel, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d at p. 832.)
Darren Chaker notes on a motion to quash a search warrant, “the question facing a reviewing court asked to determine whether probable cause supported the issuance of the warrant is whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding a fair probability existed that a search would uncover wrongdoing.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1040.) This is accomplished by reviewing only the “four corners” of the warrant, and no other outside sources. (See United States v. Luong (9th Cir. 2006) 470 F.3d 898, 904-05;People v. Costello (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 431, 451.)
Darren Chaker also notes, probable cause “is a fluid concept – turning on the assessment of probabilities in a particular factual case….” (Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 232, 103 S.Ct. at p. 2329.) Second, because affidavits “are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation,” “[t]technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place ….” (United States v. Ventresca (1965) 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 746, 13 L.Ed.2d 684.)
The search warrant affidavit “must provide a substantial basis from which a magistrate can reasonably conclude there is a fair probability that the place to be searched contains contraband or evidence of a crime.” (People v. Hernandez (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 919, 923; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at p. 238, 103 S. Ct. at p. 2332 [affidavit must establish a “fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”].) “The question-similar to every inquiry into probable cause-is whether all of the facts …, viewed through the lens of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime.” (Florida v. Harris (2013) U.S. , 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1053, 185 L.Ed.2d 61; see also Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at pp. 235-36, 103 S.Ct. at p. 2331 [warrants are properly issued “on the basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen applying a standard less demanding than those used in more formal legal proceedings.”)
Last, Darren Chaker reminds readers that, “[L]ogical inferences may be drawn and the magistrate may consider matters of common knowledge concerning human behavior.” (People v. Miller (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 194, 200; see also Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 240, 103 S.Ct. at p. 2333 [magistrates are free to “draw such reasonable inferences as he will from the material supplied to him by applicants for a warrant”].) In People v. Ulloa (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1007, [*13] the Court of Appeal upheld a warrant to seize all computers within the defendant’s home even though there was no direct evidence in the affidavit that the defendant had a home computer, because “home computers are now common;” and because the defendant had been communicating with a minor by computer, and “it was reasonable to assume that the computer would contain relevant incriminating information, and that the computer would be located in defendant’s home.”
Darren Chaker article on search and seizure law. The “‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”‘ Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (citation omitted). Indeed, the Fourth Amendment “ordinarily prohibits] the warrantless entry of a person’s house as unreasonable per se.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006). Often times, police gain entry to a home or hotel through ‘apparent authority’, often a guest or roommate.
“A ‘search’ occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). “Almost a century ago the Court stated in resounding terms that the principles reflected in the [Fourth] Amendment. . . ‘apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man’s home.”‘ Payton, 445 U.S. at 585 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). “It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Id. at 586 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477 (1971)).
Indeed, “a warrantless entry to search for weapons or contraband is unconstitutional even when a felony has been committed and there is probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found within.” Id. at 587-588. See also id. at 588 n.26 (“‘It is settled doctrine that probable cause for belief that certain articles subject to seizure are in a dwelling cannot of itself justify a search without a warrant.”‘) (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497 (1958)).
Darren Chaker also notes in Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964), for example, a hotel clerk’s consent to police entering the defendant’s room did not cure the officers’ failure to get a warrant. “It is true,” the Court explained, “that when a person engages a hotel room he undoubtedly gives ‘implied or express permission’ to ‘such persons as maids, janitors or repairmen’ to enter his room ‘in the performance of their duties.’ But the conduct of the night clerk and the police in the present case was of an entirely different order.” Id. at 489 (quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)). The conduct was to search the defendant’s room for evidence of armed robbery, and there was “nothing in the record to indicate that the police had any basis whatsoever to believe that the night clerk had been authorized by the [defendant] to permit the police to search [his] room.” Id.
Likewise, in Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), a landlord’s consent to police entering the defendant’s home did not cure the officers’ failure to get a warrant. Though the landlord had passed the home, smelled what he thought might be illicit liquor, and had the right under state law to inspect the premises for waste, the Court rejected the notion that he thus had authority to admit the police: “‘ [T]heir purpose in entering was not to view waste but to search for distilling equipment,”‘ and “to uphold such an entry, search and seizure ‘without a warrant would reduce the Fourth Amendment to a nullity and leave tenants’ homes secure only in the discretion of landlords.”‘ Id. at 616-617. See also, United States v. Reid, 226 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000) (no apparent authority where officer knew person who consented to entry, despite answering front door, was not registered tenant and had not been seen in the building by other residents).
The Court reaffirmed these principles in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006): “A person on the scene who identifies himself, say, as a landlord or a hotel manager calls up no customary understanding of authority to admit guests without the consent of the current occupant.” Id. at 112.
In sum, the law provides basic instruction on the obligations of police prior to relying on apparent authority of a person to conduct entry, or search of a residence or hotel.