The consent defense in California rape cases takes two forms. The defense may argue the other person actually consented, meaning positive cooperation in act or attitude given freely and with knowledge of the act. Or it may argue the defendant actually and reasonably believed there was consent, a defense recognized in People v. Mayberry and in CALCRIM No. 1000.
Reviewed and updated November 9, 2026. Darren Chaker, a San Diego legal research and court-records specialist, reviewed the statutes and cases cited here.
Key Takeaways
- Penal Code § 261.6 defines consent as “positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will.”
- A current or past dating or marital relationship is not, by itself, consent.
- A defendant who actually and reasonably believed the other person consented is not guilty of rape. Once the defense is raised, the prosecution must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Effective February 20, 2026, the Judicial Council revised CALCRIM No. 1000 so the instruction’s definition of consent tracks § 261.6 in full and uses gender-neutral terms.
- The trial court must give the reasonable-belief instruction on its own motion only when substantial evidence shows equivocal conduct.
How Does California Penal Code § 261.6 Define Consent?
The governing definition is Penal Code § 261.6. It applies in prosecutions under §§ 261 (rape), 286 (sodomy), 287 (oral copulation), and 289 (sexual penetration). Consent requires positive cooperation, a free and voluntary choice, and knowledge of the nature of the act. Subdivision (b) adds that a dating or marital relationship does not establish consent. Subdivision (c) says the section does not change evidentiary rules or the burden of proof.
In practice, this means silence or a lack of resistance does not prove consent, and the history of a relationship cannot substitute for evidence of what happened during the encounter itself.
What Changed in CALCRIM No. 1000 in 2026?
Earlier versions of this post described a 2025 Senate bill that supposedly rewrote § 261.6. No such bill changed the statute; the text of § 261.6 quoted above is current. The real 2026 change was to the jury instruction.
In its October 2025 invitation to comment, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions proposed expanding the consent definition in CALCRIM Nos. 1000, 1015, 1030, and 1045 to match the full statutory language, and replacing “woman” with “person” in No. 1000. According to the Judicial Council’s Rules Committee materials, a committee member pointed out that the old definition omitted part of § 261.6(a). The council approved the revisions effective February 20, 2026. The instruction now tells jurors that to consent, a person must know the nature of the act, act freely and voluntarily, and positively cooperate by act or attitude.

What Is the People v. Mayberry Reasonable-Belief Defense?
In People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143 (1975), the California Supreme Court held that a defendant’s reasonable and good-faith but mistaken belief that the other person consented is a defense to rape. The defense has both a subjective part (the defendant actually believed there was consent) and an objective part (the belief was reasonable). A belief based on intoxication or wishful thinking that a reasonable person would not share does not qualify.
CALCRIM No. 1000 puts the burden on the prosecution: once the instruction is given, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually and reasonably believe there was consent. The instruction also has an optional sentence for cases where the issue is whether the defendant reasonably believed consent continued throughout the act.
When Must the Court Give the People v. Williams Instruction?
The trial court has a duty to give the reasonable-belief instruction on its own motion only when the record contains substantial evidence of equivocal conduct. The CALCRIM bench notes cite People v. Williams, 4 Cal. 4th 354, 362 (1992), for this rule. When the two sides tell completely different stories, such as one describing a consensual encounter and the other a violent attack, there may be no middle ground of equivocal conduct, and the court may refuse the instruction. When the evidence shows ambiguous signals, the instruction is generally required, and failing to give it can be reversible error.
Building or Challenging a People v. Mayberry Consent Defense
- Communications. Text messages, social media messages, and call logs before and after the encounter often decide credibility.
- Timeline. Rideshare records, building access logs, and video establish where each person was and for how long.
- Intoxication. Evidence of the other person’s capacity to consent can raise separate charges under § 261(a)(3), so the defense must address it directly.
- Instruction requests. Defense counsel should request the reasonable-belief language and the continuing-consent sentence where the evidence supports them, and make a record if the court refuses.
Related reading from Darren Chaker includes California habeas corpus petitions for post-conviction challenges, sealing records in California, and overbroad probation conditions.
Key Authorities
- Cal. Penal Code § 261.6(a) (“‘[C]onsent’ means positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction involved.”).
- Cal. Penal Code § 261.6(b) (“A current or previous dating or marital relationship is not sufficient to constitute consent . . . .”).
- Judicial Council of Cal., Crim. Jury Instns., CALCRIM No. 1000 (proposed rev. Oct. 2025, adopted Feb. 2026) (“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the other person consented.”).
- Id., bench notes (citing People v. Williams, 4 Cal. 4th 354, 362 (1992), and People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 153–58 (1975)) (court must instruct where there is “substantial evidence of equivocal conduct that would have led a defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe consent existed where it did not.”).
Which Consent Defense Fits the Facts?
In practice, the defense theory has to match the evidence. For example, a mistaken-belief defense needs evidence of conduct that was “equivocal,” while an actual-consent defense attacks the complaining witness’s account directly.
| Defense theory | What must be shown | Key authority |
|---|---|---|
| Actual consent | Positive cooperation in act or attitude, given freely and knowingly | Penal Code § 261.6(a) |
| Reasonable and good-faith belief | Substantial evidence of equivocal conduct | People v. Williams, 4 Cal. 4th 354, 362 (1992) |
| Withdrawn consent | Defense ends once withdrawal is communicated | In re John Z., 29 Cal. 4th 756, 760 (2003) |
Does a prior relationship prove consent in California?
No. Penal Code § 261.6(b) provides that “[a] current or previous dating or marital relationship shall not be sufficient to constitute consent.” The relationship may still be relevant to the defendant’s belief, but it cannot carry the defense by itself.
What happens if consent is withdrawn during intercourse?
Withdrawn consent ends the defense going forward. The California Supreme Court held that “a withdrawal of consent effectively nullifies any earlier consent and subjects the male to forcible rape charges if he persists in what has become nonconsensual intercourse.” In re John Z., 29 Cal. 4th 756, 760 (2003).
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the legal definition of consent in California?
Under Penal Code § 261.6, consent means positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and know the nature of the act.
Is a reasonable but mistaken belief in consent a defense?
Yes. Under People v. Mayberry and CALCRIM No. 1000, a defendant who actually and reasonably believed the other person consented is not guilty of rape, and the prosecution must disprove that belief beyond a reasonable doubt.
Did California change its consent law in 2026?
The statute did not change. The Judicial Council revised CALCRIM No. 1000, effective February 20, 2026, so the jury instruction tracks the full statutory definition and uses gender-neutral language.
This article is for general information only and is not legal advice. Learn more about Darren Chaker. Last reviewed November 2026.