Chaker v. Crogan is a 2005 Ninth Circuit decision holding that California Penal Code § 148.6, which made it a crime to knowingly file a false complaint against a peace officer, violated the First Amendment because it punished only speech critical of police while leaving false statements supporting police unpunished. Twenty years later, the California Supreme Court reached the same bottom line on different reasoning.
Key Takeaways
- The Ninth Circuit granted Darren Chaker’s federal habeas petition and ordered the writ issued, holding § 148.6 was impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
- The California Supreme Court had upheld the same statute in People v. Stanistreet (2002), creating a rare state–federal split on one statute.
- On November 10, 2025, the California Supreme Court held 6–1 in Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles that § 148.6(a) violates the First Amendment.
- The case remains a leading authority on viewpoint discrimination, police accountability, and the right to petition government.
What Did Penal Code § 148.6 Require?
Section 148.6 made it a misdemeanor to file an allegation of peace-officer misconduct knowing it to be false. It also required agencies to have every complainant sign an advisory warning that a knowingly false complaint could be prosecuted. In practice, a person walking into a police station to report misconduct was handed a form warning that the complaint itself could lead to criminal charges.
The problem was the statute’s asymmetry. An officer, or a witness defending the officer, who lied during the same investigation faced no parallel prosecution under § 148.6. Only the complainant’s speech was targeted.
What Did the Ninth Circuit Hold in Chaker v. Crogan?
Darren Chaker was convicted under § 148.6 after filing a complaint against an officer. After exhausting state remedies, he petitioned for federal habeas corpus. The district court denied relief, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. The panel applied R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul and concluded that even within a category of unprotected speech, such as knowing falsehoods, the government may not pick sides based on viewpoint.
The court emphasized that the fix was simple: California could punish all knowingly false statements made during a misconduct investigation, regardless of which side made them. Because the statute did not do so, Chaker’s conviction could not stand. You can read the full opinion on the Ninth Circuit’s website.
Why Did California Courts Keep Enforcing § 148.6 After People v. Stanistreet?
Federal circuit decisions on federal constitutional questions do not bind California state courts. Three years before Chaker, the California Supreme Court had upheld § 148.6 in People v. Stanistreet, 29 Cal.4th 497 (2002). That left California law enforcement in an unusual position: federal habeas courts in California treated the statute as unconstitutional, while state courts treated it as valid. The appellate firm Horvitz & Levy described the situation as one where, “[u]ncommonly, there’s a split on the issue between a 2002 California Supreme Court opinion (statute is constitutional) and a 2005 Ninth Circuit decision (statute is not constitutional)” (Horvitz & Levy).
How Did L.A. Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles Resolve the Split in 2025?
The split ended in Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles, No. S275272. The City of Los Angeles had stopped requiring the signed § 148.6 advisory, citing Chaker, and the police union sued. The California Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Groban, held that § 148.6(a) violates the First Amendment. The court did not adopt the Ninth Circuit’s viewpoint rationale. Instead, it held that the statute’s criminal penalty, mandatory admonition, one-sided operation, and unclear scope together chilled truthful complaints, and that it failed intermediate scrutiny because it was not narrowly tailored. Justice Liu dissented. The opinion is available on the California Courts website, with a modification filed January 22, 2026.
Horvitz & Levy’s summary of the ruling is available in its post on the 6–1 decision striking down § 148.6.
What Is the Timeline of Chaker v. Crogan and Penal Code § 148.6?
Darren Chaker’s habeas case sits in the middle of a three-decade arc. Reading the decisions in order shows how a single federal ruling changed the law even before California’s own high court caught up.
- 1995: The Legislature enacts Penal Code § 148.6, making it a misdemeanor to file a knowingly false complaint against a peace officer and requiring complainants to sign a warning that only they, and not the officer, face prosecution.
- 2002: In People v. Stanistreet, 29 Cal. 4th 497 (2002), the California Supreme Court upholds the statute.
- November 2, 2005: The Ninth Circuit decides Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005), holds § 148.6 viewpoint discriminatory, and grants the writ.
- 2005–2025: State and federal courts in California follow different rules, leaving police agencies, complainants, and prosecutors with a well-known split of authority.
- November 10, 2025: In L.A. Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles, No. S275272, the California Supreme Court revisits Stanistreet and holds § 148.6(a) unconstitutional on narrow-tailoring grounds.
How Do People v. Stanistreet, Chaker v. Crogan, and L.A. Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles Compare?
| Decision | Court and Year | Result | Core Reasoning |
|---|---|---|---|
| People v. Stanistreet | Cal. Supreme Court, 2002 | Statute upheld | Knowingly false statements are unprotected, so the State may single out false complaints against officers. |
| Chaker v. Crogan | Ninth Circuit, 2005 | Statute invalid; writ granted | Viewpoint discrimination: only complainants, not officers or supporting witnesses, face prosecution for lies. |
| LAPPL v. City of Los Angeles | Cal. Supreme Court, 2025 | § 148.6(a) invalid | The statute burdens substantially more speech than necessary; the court reached the result through narrow tailoring rather than viewpoint analysis. |
Is Knowingly False Speech Protected by the First Amendment Under Chaker v. Crogan?
Not as a general matter, and that is exactly why Chaker v. Crogan is important. The Ninth Circuit did not hold that people have a right to lie about the police. It held that even within a category of unprotected speech, the government may not pick sides. Darren Chaker’s case applied that principle to the one setting where it matters most: citizen complaints about official misconduct.
- R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (“St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”).
- Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (“[T]he knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.”).
Read together, these authorities explain the holding in one sentence: California could punish knowingly false statements in a misconduct investigation, but it could not punish only the false statements that cut against the officer.
Key Authorities
- Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005), slip op. at 15118 (“Because section 148.6 targets only knowingly false speech critical of peace officer conduct during the course of a complaint investigation, we conclude that the statute impermissibly regulates speech on the basis of a speaker’s viewpoint.”).
- Id., slip op. at 15119 (“[A]ny impermissible viewpoint-based bias present in the complaint investigation process is easily cured: California can make all parties to an investigation of peace officer misconduct subject to sanction for knowingly making false statements.”).
- Id., slip op. at 15120 (“Because Chaker’s conviction was obtained under a statute that runs afoul of the First Amendment, we reverse the judgment of the district court, grant Chaker’s petition for habeas corpus, and remand for issuance of the writ.”).
- L.A. Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles, No. S275272, slip op. at 13 (Cal. Nov. 10, 2025) (“[W]hile we apply different reasoning than the Chaker court, we agree that subsequent developments in the law warrant a reconsideration of our holding in Stanistreet.”).
- Id., slip op. at 8 (explaining that the court “part[s] ways with Stanistreet by now concluding that, as presently drafted, section 148.6(a) ‘burdens substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests'”).
Why Chaker v. Crogan Still Matters
The case is cited well beyond police complaints. It is a clear example of the rule that the government may not regulate even unprotected speech in a viewpoint-discriminatory way. It also shows how habeas corpus can be used to test a statute’s constitutionality after a conviction. And it reinforces the value of the right to petition government for redress, which depends on people being able to report misconduct without fear of one-sided prosecution.
For related analysis, see Darren Chaker’s discussion of false complaints and viewpoint discrimination, his overview of blogger First Amendment rights, and his guide to California habeas corpus petitions.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the citation for Chaker v. Crogan?
Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005), Ninth Circuit No. 03-56885.
Is Penal Code § 148.6 still enforceable in California?
The California Supreme Court held in November 2025 that § 148.6(a) violates the First Amendment, so the advisory and prosecution scheme in its current form is unconstitutional under both state and federal precedent. Anyone facing a specific situation should consult a licensed attorney.
Did the California Supreme Court adopt the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit?
No. It agreed with the result but relied on intermediate scrutiny and narrow tailoring rather than the Ninth Circuit’s viewpoint-discrimination analysis.
Who is Darren Chaker?
Darren Chaker was the habeas petitioner in Chaker v. Crogan and writes about the First Amendment, privacy, and criminal procedure. Read more on the About Darren Chaker page.
What did Darren Chaker argue in Chaker v. Crogan?
Darren Chaker argued that Penal Code § 148.6 punished only complainants who made false statements about officers, while officers and witnesses who lied in the officer’s favor faced no comparable penalty, making the statute viewpoint discriminatory under R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.
Does Chaker v. Crogan protect people who lie about police?
No. Chaker v. Crogan does not create a right to make knowingly false statements. It holds that the government may not regulate false statements in a one-sided way that targets only speech critical of peace officers.
This article is for general information only and is not legal advice. Last reviewed November 2026.
Comments are closed.