
A geofence warrant directs a technology company to identify every device that was inside a defined geographic area during a specified time window. On June 29, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Chatrie v. United States that obtaining a person’s cell-phone location history this way is a Fourth Amendment search, even when the data is held by a third party and covers only a short period.
Reviewed and updated November 9, 2026. Darren Chaker, a San Diego AI forensics specialist who studies location-data evidence, reviewed this post after the Supreme Court’s June 29, 2026 decision.
Key Takeaways
- Chatrie v. United States (2026) held that police conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they obtained Google Location History data, and remanded for the lower court to decide whether the warrant was valid.
- The Fifth Circuit held in 2024 that geofence warrants are modern-day general warrants categorically prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, though it applied the good-faith exception.
- California’s Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA) separately requires a warrant or other legal process before state agencies obtain electronic device information.
- Defense motions should now focus on particularity, probable cause, and each step of the anonymized-to-identified data process.
How Did a Geofence Warrant Work in Chatrie v. United States?
A typical geofence warrant proceeds in steps. First, police draw a boundary around a crime scene and ask the provider for anonymized identifiers of every device inside it during a set time. Second, investigators review that list and request additional location data for selected devices, sometimes outside the original boundary. Third, police ask the provider to reveal account names for the devices they consider relevant. Each step expands what the government learns, often about people who had nothing to do with the crime.
What Did the Supreme Court Decide in Chatrie v. United States?
Okello Chatrie was identified through a geofence warrant served on Google after a credit union robbery in Virginia. The Supreme Court, by a 6–3 vote as reported by WilmerHale, held that the government’s acquisition of his location history was a search. The Court rejected the argument that ordinary phone use amounts to voluntarily sharing location with a third party. It did not decide whether the warrant itself was constitutional; instead it vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and sent the case back to examine particularity and probable cause at each step. The slip opinion is on the Supreme Court’s website.
The practical effect is significant. Before Chatrie, prosecutors could argue that a defendant had no Fourth Amendment interest in data voluntarily stored with Google or another provider, ending the analysis. That argument is now foreclosed for location history. Every geofence request must instead be justified as a reasonable search, which shifts the litigation to the warrant’s scope, the size of the boundary, and how much discretion officers kept for themselves.
WilmerHale’s client alert, “The Fourth Amendment Moves to the Cloud,” describes the decision as rejecting a third-party-doctrine exception for location history.
Are Geofence Warrants Unconstitutional Under United States v. Smith?
The Supreme Court left that question open. The Fifth Circuit has already answered it. In United States v. Smith, the court held that geofence warrants are general warrants because they authorize a search of every user’s location data without individualized probable cause, then let officers decide whose information to unmask. The court nevertheless affirmed the denial of suppression because officers relied in good faith on a warrant at a time when the law was unsettled. The opinion is available from the Fifth Circuit.
After Chatrie, the good-faith exception will be harder for the government to invoke for future warrants, because officers are now on notice that location history is protected and that each step must satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
How Does California Law Add Protection Under CalECPA?
California’s Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Penal Code § 1546.1, generally bars state government entities from compelling production of electronic communication information, including location information, from a service provider except by warrant or other specified process. CalECPA also includes notice requirements and a statutory suppression remedy, which give California defendants arguments independent of the federal exclusionary rule.
Key Authorities
- Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112, slip op. at 2 (U.S. June 29, 2026) (“An individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in records about his cell phone’s location, and police intrude on that constitutionally protected interest when they demand the information—even though for only a limited time, and from a third-party tech company.”).
- Id., slip op. at 29 (“A cell-phone user is not to be viewed as sharing private information with third parties—which then can be freely passed on to the government—just by doing the ordinary things cell-phone users do.”).
- Id., slip op. at 32 (“It is therefore now up to the Court of Appeals to decide whether, at each step of the search process, the warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s requirements of particularity and probable cause.”).
- United States v. Smith, 110 F.4th 817 (5th Cir. 2024), slip op. at 34 (“[W]e hold that geofence warrants are general warrants categorically prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.”).
- Id., slip op. at 2 (“[H]ere, law enforcement acted in good faith in relying on this type of warrant.”).
Challenging a Geofence Warrant in California After Chatrie v. United States
- Scope. Was the boundary or time window larger than the probable cause supported?
- Officer discretion. Did the warrant let police, rather than a judge, decide whose identities to reveal?
- Step-by-step review. Did officers return to the judge before expanding the search or de-anonymizing users?
- CalECPA compliance. Was the required notice given, and was the warrant limited as the statute requires?
Related reading from Darren Chaker includes probable cause to arrest, border phone searches, and compelled decryption under the Fifth Amendment.
How Does a Geofence Warrant Move Through Each Step?
Because Chatrie focuses on each stage of the warrant, defense counsel should review every step separately rather than the warrant as a whole.
| Step | What police receive | Question after Chatrie |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Anonymized list | Device IDs inside the boundary and time window | Was there probable cause for the area and time chosen? |
| 2. Expanded data | Movement outside the boundary for selected devices | Did a judge, not the officer, approve the expansion? |
| 3. De-anonymization | Names and account details for chosen devices | Was each identification particularly described? |
What happens next in Chatrie after the Supreme Court decision?
The Court held that acquiring Google Location History was a Fourth Amendment search and sent the case back to the Fourth Circuit. On remand, that court must decide whether the warrant satisfied probable cause and particularity at each step of Google’s three-step process. See Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112 (U.S. June 29, 2026).
Does California law add protections beyond the Fourth Amendment?
Yes. CalECPA requires a warrant for most electronic device information and allows a motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the act. Cal. Penal Code §§ 1546.1, 1546.4. Therefore, a California defendant can raise both a statutory and a constitutional challenge to a geofence warrant.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is a geofence warrant a search?
Yes. The Supreme Court held in Chatrie v. United States (2026) that obtaining a person’s cell-phone location history is a Fourth Amendment search.
Are geofence warrants illegal?
The Supreme Court did not decide that. The Fifth Circuit held them categorically unconstitutional in United States v. Smith (2024); other courts review them case by case.
Does California require a warrant for location data?
Generally yes. CalECPA, Penal Code § 1546.1, requires a warrant or other specified process for state agencies to compel electronic location information from providers.
This article is for general information only and is not legal advice. Learn more about Darren Chaker. Last reviewed November 2026.